

# Climate Risks, Opportunities, and Geopolitics




**Gernot Wagner**

[gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

[gwagner.com](http://gwagner.com)

1D 5D 1M 6M YTD 1Y 5Y MAX



 Tesla Inc

\$362.89

+\$186.14

↑ 105.31%

 BYD Ord Shs A

¥362.88

+¥155.50

↑ 74.98%



**BlackRock.**

# **Managing the net-zero transition**

# Climate Risks, Opportunities, and Geopolitics

28 May 2025



- ① Climate risk is financial risk
- ② Solar
- ③ Steel
- ④ Is the goal a high or a low price per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>?

**Gernot Wagner**


[gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

[gwagner.com](http://gwagner.com)

~\$200 / tCO<sub>2</sub>

# ~\$185 Social Cost of CO<sub>2</sub>

Based on 2% constant discount rate, with most of the increase due to discounting




~\$50 to ~\$80 from updated damages,  
~\$80 to ~\$185 from discounting

$> \$200 / \text{tCO}_2$

# “Synthetic” Social Cost of Carbon with median = \$185 and mean = \$284


For 1 tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> emitted in 2020, in \$2020, with 5%–95% range of \$32–\$874(!)





> ~\$200 / tCO<sub>2</sub> :

Climate damage quantification  
including tipping points




Tail risks

Discounting

Risk calibration, equity, etc.

# Climate sensitivity “likely” between ~2-4.5°C

Latest assessment narrows 66% “likely” range from 1.5-4.5°C



Tail risk might dwarf importance of “likely” range

>~\$200 / tCO<sub>2</sub>:

Climate damage quantification

including tipping points


Tail risks

Discounting

Risk calibration, equity, etc.

# Economic impacts of tipping points in the climate system

Tipping points increase SCC by between ~27-43%, with large, right-skewed distribution



~ \$200 / tCO<sub>2</sub>

=

~8-10% of  
*global* GDP

~ \$1,000 / tCO<sub>2</sub>

=

~50%(!!) of  
*global* GDP

> \$150 /  
car entering NYC\*

\* Manhattan below 60<sup>th</sup> Street

The New York Times

# There's Only One Way to Fix New York's Traffic Gridlock

June 8, 2023



Congestion pricing is the **only durable antidote to persistent traffic congestion**. The Columbia University economist and Nobel laureate William Vickrey demonstrated 60 years ago that there's no way out of gridlock without making drivers pay for taking up limited street space. Otherwise, there will always be more car owners wanting to use the available space than there is space to accommodate them.

Komanoff & Wagner, [NYT](#) (8 June 2023)



The New York Times

# There's Only One Way to York's Traffic Gridlock


June 8, 2023



Congestion pricing is the **only durable antidote to persistent traffic congestion**. The Columbia University economist and Nobel laureate William Vickrey demonstrated 60 years ago that there is no way out of gridlock without making drivers pay for taking up limited street space. Otherwise, there will always be more car owners wanting to use the available space than there is space to accommodate them.



The MTA Board has approved a phase-in approach to the Central Business District Tolling Program, now scheduled to begin January 5 with 40% lower rates. Visit [congestionreliefzone.mta.info](https://congestionreliefzone.mta.info) for more details.



From [congestionreliefzone.mta.info](https://congestionreliefzone.mta.info)

1:51 PM · Nov 18, 2024 · 32K Views

Komanoff & Wagner, [NYT](#) (8 June 2023)

# Our City Could Become One of the World's Greenest, but It Won't Be Easy

Feb. 7, 2023



The rewards the city reaps will not only be reputational. If New York cracks this decarbonization nut (as it started to do under Mayor Michael Bloomberg with [transport](#) and especially bike lanes), the city's hard-to-bear summers, when the asphalt, steel and brick absorb the sun's rays and turn the city into a [heat island](#) will mellow. The noise from air-conditioners and boilers will ebb.

It will be a much nicer place to live.

Greenberg & Wagner, [NYT](#) (7 February 2023)

**Risks, uncertainties, unknowns,  
tails > 'known knowns'**


**Climate policy risk > climate  
risk**



# Climate Risk vs Policy Risk

# Climate Risk & Policy Risk

## How does climate change affect or is expected to affect your business's revenue, costs, and investments?





# Climate Risks, Opportunities, and Geopolitics

28 May 2025




- ① Climate risk is financial risk
- ② Solar
- ③ Steel
- ④ Is the goal a high or a low price per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>?

**Gernot Wagner**


[gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

[gwagner.com](http://gwagner.com)




Source: Global Carbon Project (2024)





Source: Global Carbon Project (2024)




Source: Global Carbon Project (2024) + umpteen climate-economic model runs



## Major course correction needed to achieve the 1.5°C ambition

Net CO<sub>2</sub>e per year



**-7%**  
annual reduction in  
emissions needed by  
2030 to meet the 1.5°C  
pathway

**+1.5%**  
recent annual increase  
in emissions from  
2011-2021


Sources: IPCC, PIK, BCG analysis

## DAWN OF THE SOLAR AGE

A SPECIAL ISSUE

↓ **EASY PV** *how solar outgrew expectations*


On average, actual installations have been more than three times higher than their five-year forecasts



Installations for 2024 are an estimate from BloombergNEF for direct current solar capacity

Sources: IEA; Energy Institute; BloombergNEF





Briefing | Carbon bargain


# The energy transition will be much cheaper than you think

Most analysts overestimate energy demand and underestimate technological advances

## Unshakable pessimism

2

Global renewable energy\*, capacity added each year, GW



\*Includes solar, wind, hydropower, bioenergy, geothermal and marine <sup>†</sup>Existing-policies scenario, lower-end estimates  
Source: IEA

**Renewables revolution  
unstoppable\***


**and so are climate impacts**



\* “Trump can and will handicap domestic industries in jockeying for positions in [the global climate race], but he cannot halt it.” ([What Will Trump’s Victory Mean for the Climate?](#), 9 November 2024)

# Large abatement opportunities available at low or no cost


McKinsey Global v2.0 effort in 2009 identified 38 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e abatement potential in 2030



Note: The curve presents an estimate of the maximum potential of all technical GHG abatement measures below €60 per tCO<sub>2</sub>e if each lever was pursued aggressively. It is not a forecast of what role different abatement measures and technologies will play.  
Source: Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve v2.0

**Exhibit 46: The IRA has transformed the cost curve of the US bringing most technologies in the money, especially in the transportation and buildings sectors**

US carbon abatement cost curve for anthropogenic GHG emissions, based on current technologies and current costs, assuming economies of scale for technologies in the pilot phase prior and after IRA






## How costly, or costless, is climate emissions mitigation? p. 1001



## Comparison of global mitigation potentials at different costs

The IPCC results use different baseline emissions to calculate the range of mitigation potentials. The top panel reports the full set of results, and the bottom panel reports only the mitigation potentials with costs  $> \$0$  per tonne of  $\text{CO}_2$  equivalent ( $\text{tCO}_2\text{-eq}$ ). USD reported in 2020 dollars. See supplementary materials.



Source: Kotchen, Rising & Wagner. "The costs of "costless" climate mitigation." *Science* (30 November 2023).






Bernd Heid, Senior Partner, McKinsey, at Columbia Business School, 18 November 2024


# “Moore’s Law” of climate technology: 100x scale-up drives 70%+ cost-down

Abatement cost, \$/tCO<sub>2</sub>


## Early innovation



## Commercialization




## Global deployment






# 10 % of techs in the money today – steep cost-down to 2030

Estimated abatement costs, USD/tCO<sub>2</sub>e



# 100\$/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon tax would make most techs competitive

Estimated abatement costs, USD/tCO<sub>2</sub>e




# Scaling Solar

Hyae Ryung Kim, Marcelo Cibie, Max de Boer, Lara Geiger, Isabel Hoyos, Taicheng Jin, Hassan Riaz, and Gernot Wagner

↓ **HERE COMES THE SUN** *the past and a possible future*

Global useful energy consumption\*  
terawatt hours, '000




Sources: Rupert Way; Our World in Data

\*Primary energy adjusted for waste-heat losses <sup>†</sup>From Way et al. (2022) <sup>‡</sup>Electricity-conversion technologies (eg green hydrogen)

Source: *Economist* "[Sun Machines](#)" (20 June 2024)

# Utility-scale solar and wind now cheaper than fossil fuels, battery storage costs not far behind, falling fast

## • Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) & Storage (LCOS), US\$/MWh




### Observations

- **Solar photovoltaic (PV) prices dropped ~80% in past decade, wind by ~70%, lithium-ion battery costs by ~90%.**
  - PV price drop primarily driven by **improvements in module efficiency** and **economies of scale** (Kavlak *et al*)
  - Onshore **wind cheap the longest**, now only beaten by PV (Lazard).
  - Lithium-ion **battery costs fell 20% in 2023** alone (BNEF).
- **Gas combined cycle power plants cheaper than coal**, more expensive than both solar and wind.
  - Rapid scale-up of utility-scale batteries “killer app” to replace gas on grid.
  - **Battery prices expected to continue to fall** due to cell manufacturing overcapacity, economies of scale, and switch to lower-cost lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) batteries.



# Deployment environments differ across states and energy markets, with ISO-NE and CAISO leading in the US

## State-level solar receptiveness graded on a letter scale



### Observations

- A state's solar attractiveness is principally determined by:
  - **Incentives** including state rebates, SRECs (solar renewable energy certificates), and community solar
  - **Electricity rates** determining energy saving, which make up the bulk of the revenue to repay investment
  - **Net metering rules** setting rates utilities pay for returned solar energy; e.g. "net metering" pays the retail unit energy cost (same a customers pay to receive energy), whereas "net billing" applies wholesale rate, reducing revenue a customer receives
  - **Solar irradiation** measuring how much sunshine an area receives, on average, over a period of time
- **CA and Northeastern states** are the friendliest solar states due to state level incentives like NJ's SREC, PA's elevated electricity rates, or NY's offering of Tax Credit Bridge Loans and VDER net-metering arrangement

Note: CAISO is the California Independent System Operator and ISO-NE is the Independent State Operator North-East.


Sources: [SolarKal](#) (2025); [NREL](#); [EIA, Electric Power Annual Reports](#) (2024); [Berkeley Labs](#) (2024).

Credit: Taicheng Jin, Hassan Riaz, Isabel Hoyos, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): Kim *et al.*, "Scaling Solar" (20 March 2025).

# Federal ITCs and PTCs provide limited relief, but state incentives play a crucial role in pushing projects past investors' hurdle rate

e.g. REC could boost IRR by 7-15% and cut payback by 2-5 years

Waterfall of a 1MW project without state-incentives



Return Profile if based in:

Annual income in New Jersey	
(+) Energy Savings:	\$150,000
(+) REC Revenue:	\$125,000
Project IRR: 24-26%	
Payback Period: 6 Years	

Annual income in Florida	
(+) Energy Savings:	\$128,000
Project IRR: 11-13%	
Payback Period: 7 Years	

Annual income in Texas	
(+) Energy Savings:	~\$128,000
Project IRR: ~8-16%	
Payback Period: ~5-10 Years	

## Observations

- Federal incentives provide a significant boost, but **strong state-level incentives can push a project over hurdle rate**
  - Federal level:** ITC, PTC, Accelerated Depreciation
  - State level:** state Credits, RECs, rebates, state tax exemption, net-metering, renewable portfolio standards (RPS), interconnection standards
  - County level:** rebates & grants, buildings standards
  - Community level:** energy-efficient organizations, regional partnerships
- NJ, FL, and TX offer **varying levels of state-incentives**, resulting in different levels of project IRR
  - New Jersey:** The **Successor Solar Incentive (SuSI)** program rewards solar energy production with **SREC-II certificates**, valued at **\$85-\$90 per MWh for 15 years**. Solar equipment is exempt from sale and property taxes, and net metering allows generators to sell excess electricity back to the grid.
  - Florida:** The state exempts added value of solar energy system from **property taxes and sales taxes**. Statewide net metering policy allows full credit on utility bills. Local utilities offer **\$2,000-\$4,000 rebates** for solar battery installations.
  - Texas:** **Several** utilities provide **\$2,500-\$3,000 rebates** for solar PV of at least 3 kW. Some utilities and retail energy providers offer **solar buyback programs** that provide bill credits or cash for surplus energy fed back into the grid.

\* Diagonal represent additional cost/savings for range estimate.

\*\* Assuming a standard 1 MW solar project (BTM/direct ownership): On-site system, behind the meter, for self-consumption; direct ownership provides full control, access to tax incentives, and long-term savings.


Note: Texas has a larger band of uncertainty around buybacks depending on location

Sources: [Solar.com](#)'s Solar Rebates by State; [Forbes](#) (2024); [EnergySage](#) (2025); Texas Power Guide; DSIRE; [Canary Media](#) (2025); Data for solar project IRR models provided by [SolarKal](#).

Credit: Taicheng Jin, Hassan Riaz, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): Kim *et al.*, "Scaling Solar" (20 March 2025).

# Deregulated Texas energy market boon for solar, surpassing California in 2024

## Total installed utility-scale solar capacity in Texas and California, GW



### Observations

- **Texas surpassed California** as leading solar PV state after adding **1.6 GW** in Q2 of 2024 (ACP).
- Texas installed nearly **9 GW of new solar by the end of 2024** – over one-fourth of the U.S. 2024 additions – for a **total capacity of 27.5 GW** (ACP).
- Texas is **expected to install 11.6 GW** new utility-scale solar in 2025 (EIA).
- **Texas' advantage:**
  - ⊕ Deregulated, electricity-only energy market
  - ⊕ Streamlined approval process
  - ⊕ Abundant land
  - ⊖ Minimal state-incentives
- **California's challenge:**
  - ⊕ Strong state incentives
  - ⊖ Strict regulations
  - ⊖ Interconnection delays

# Solar Supply Chain



# SiO<sub>2</sub> is refined to produce ingots, which are cut into wafers and then assembled into cells and modules

## Polysilicon



- **Polysilicon** from (Si) is abundant but **does not occur in pure form**.
- First, **SiO<sub>2</sub>**, the second most abundant mineral on earth, is refined to **metallurgical-grade silicon** (98-99% pure).
- Next, met-grade silicon goes through the **Siemens process** to **remove final impurities**.
- The result is **chunks of polysilicon** with **>99.99999% (7-10N) purity**.

## Ingots




- Next, the **chunks of polysilicon** are **melted into ingots**.
- For **poly-Si ingots**, the polysilicon is **simply melted** and **allowed to solidify**, forming **many small polysilicon crystals**.
- **Monocrystalline ingots** are formed using the **Czochralski process**.
  - A polysilicon seed is dipped into the molten polysilicon, **slowly lifted, and rotated**.
  - The result is an **ingot** that consists of **one large single crystal cylindrical column**.

## Wafers



- **Polysilicon ingots** are then sawn into **wafers** either through a **slurry-based** or **diamond wire** method.
  - In the **slurry method**, the ingot is passed onto **rotating wires** spaced equidistantly and mixed with **silicon carbide solution**.
  - The diamond wire that has been **covered in small diamond particles** is gradually replacing the slurry method.
- The product is a **wafer** that measures **only 200 micrometers thick** – about **2.5x the size of a human hair**.

## Cells



- A wafer is **transformed into a solar cell** by applying several steps. The major ones are:
- **Boron** is added to create positive (**p-type**) wafers and **phosphorous** to create negative (**n-type**) wafers in a process called **doping**.
- **Metallic contacts** are applied to the **front and back of the wafer** through which **electricity can flow**.
- An **antireflective coating** is applied to help the cell **absorb more sunlight**.

## Panels / modules




- In the final step, **multiple solar cells** are **combined** to form a **single solar panel or module**.
- First, **solar cells** are **soldered together** to form an array.
- The cells are then **encapsulated in plastic**, and a **separate insulating back sheet** is added.
- Finally, several arrays are **soldered to a metal frame** and a **connector that connects the panel to the grid** is added.




# Silicon and silver make up the bulk of material cost; cell-to-module assembly represents the largest chunk of in-house cost (~60%)

Breakdown of total cost (cents per watt) – (Q3, 2023)



Material composition shares of c-Si solar panels (in %) – (world, 2021)



## Observations

- **Silicon input** accounts for around **15%** of total in-house cost:
  - **Silicon and silver** make up **>50%** of materials costs of solar c-Si panels, but material use is becoming more efficient.
  - **Polysilicon intensity** for c-Si cells dropped by **more than six times between 2004 and 2020** thanks to cell efficiency improvements.
- Cell to module is nearly **60%** of total in-house cost.
  - Cells are stringed and placed between sheets of EVA (ethylene vinyl acetate) and **laminated**; the structure is then supported with **aluminum frames**.
- **Big, integrated companies** can exert pressure on small players that have less **cost control**.
  - Companies with **cost advantage** and **cash holdings** will end up expanding market share.

Source: [Sinovoltaics](#), adapted from [BloombergNEF](#), data as of Q3 2023. Cash cost assumes in-house production from polysilicon modules to integrated solar makers, D&A, SG&A excluded.

Median used for silicon cost: \$6 ~\$7/kg, \$2.14/g polysilicon, \$1=¥7 when referring to mainland China factories.


Note: Material composition percentages are averages. Source: [IEA, Solar PV Global Supply Chains](#); [pv-manufacturing.org](#)

Credit: Taicheng Jin, Isabel Hoyos, Max de Boer, Lara Geiger, Marcelo Cibie, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#) (12 September 2024); share/adapt [with attribution](#). Contact: [gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

# Solar PV manufacturing capacity exceeds demand at every step by at least 70%; overcapacity is expected to last at least until 2030s

## Since 2017, solar PV manufacturing capacity has outstripped demand

Global solar PV manufacturing capacity along steps of the value chain (in GW)



### Observations

- Since 2015, **global solar PV manufacturing capacity** has **consistently exceeded demand**.
- **Global capacity** is expected to **more than double** in the **next five years**, based on **investment announcements** and the **expected impact of industrial policies**:
  - **IRA** – United States
  - **The Green Deal** – EU
  - **Production Linked Initiative** – India
- With **demand in 2030** expected at **800 gigawatts per year**, all currently announced production capacity would result in a **30% overcapacity in 2030**.

Note: Expected demand in 2030 is based on IEA's Net Zero Emissions (NZE) scenario. Source: [IEA, Solar PV manufacturing capacity \(2023\)](#)

Credit: Taicheng Jin, Hassan Riaz, Max de Boer, Lara Geiger, Marcelo Cibie, Hyae Ryung Kim [Gernot Wagner](#) 12 September 2024); share/adapt [with attribution](#). Contact: [gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

# China's Longi says it will lay off about 5% of employees

By Reuters

March 18, 2024 10:34 PM EDT · Updated 4 months ago



**Bloomberg**

• Live TV

Markets ▾

Economics

Industries

Tech

Politics

Businessweek

Opinion

More ▾

Green

## Longi Layoffs Speed Move in Solar Production Away From China

- Most of the job cuts will likely be in China, says Daiwa's Ip
- Chinese firms increasingly looking to move capacity offshore





# Climate Risks, Opportunities, and Geopolitics

28 May 2025



- ① Climate risk is financial risk
- ② Solar
- ③ Steel
- ④ Is the goal a high or a low price per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>?

**Gernot Wagner**

[gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

[gwagner.com](http://gwagner.com)

**26 March 2025**

# **Decarbonizing Steel**

**Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Mimi Khawsam-ang,  
Hassan Riaz, Hyae Ryung Kim & Gernot Wagner**






# Steel Sector Overview: The Problem



# Steel sector Scopes 1 and 2 around 10% of global CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions




CO<sub>2</sub>e emissions in 2024\*: ~50 billion tonnes



Sources: Scope 1 emissions from [Rhodium Group ClimateDeck](#) (September 2024); Scope 2 iron and steel estimate from [IEA](#) (2023); \* 2024 emissions based on projections.

Credit: Theo Moers, Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer *et al.*, "Decarbonizing Steel" (27 September 2025).

# At present, crude steel is produced through three main methods that all emit CO<sub>2</sub>: BF-BOF, scrap EAF, and NG DRI-EAF

	1	2	3
	<b>Blast Furnace-Basic Oxygen Furnace (BF-BOF)</b>	<b>Scrap Electric Arc Furnace (Scrap EAF)</b>	<b>Natural Gas-Based Direct Reduced Iron – Electric Arc Furnace (NG DRI-EAF)</b>
Description	Iron ore, coke, and limestone produce pure iron in a <b>blast furnace</b> , which is <b>turned into steel</b> in an oxygen furnace	Scrap metal is <b>melted in an EAF</b> using electrical energy	Iron ore is <b>turned into iron</b> using <b>natural gas</b> , which is then <b>melted in an EAF</b> to produce steel
Main inputs	Iron ore, cooking coal	Scrap steel, electricity	Iron ore, natural gas
% of global steel production	 72%	 21%	 7%
CO <sub>2</sub> per tonne of crude steel	2.4 tonnes	0.98 tonnes	1.4 tonnes
Energy intensity per tonne of crude steel	~24 GJ	~10 GJ	~22 GJ
Average cost per tonne of crude steel	~\$390	~\$415	~\$455


Sources: [World Steel Association](#); [IEEFA](#) (2022); IEA, [Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap](#) (2020); Steel Technology, [Basic Oxygen Furnace Steelmaking](#); Recycling Today, [Growth of EAF Steelmaking](#); Wildsight, [Do We Really Need Coal to Make Steel](#).

Credit: Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer *et al.*, “[Decarbonizing Steel](#)” (16 September 2024).

# BF-BOF is the cheapest production method, but regional cost differences impact margins across production methods

## Regional cost differences cause all steel making methods to be competitive

Simplified levelized cost breakdown of crude steel production via conventional routes (in USD per tonne, 2020)



### Observations

- **Profit margins** across the industry are slim – the **average EBITDA** margin of steel producers over the **past 10 years** was **8-10%**
- **Raw material** and **fuel prices** can cause **strong fluctuations in margins**, given that these typically make up between **60-80% of total production costs**
  - While **some of these markets** are **global** (iron ore), **others are more regional** (e.g. electricity, scrap steel) which can **drive regional cost differences**
- **Labor costs**, feeding into fixed OPEX, are typically **higher in advanced economies** than in **emerging economies**
- **CAPEX** for **production equipment** is usually **consistent across regions**. However, **engineering, procurement and construction costs** can **vary significantly**

(\*) Average steel price based on Hot Rolled Coil Steel Futures Continuous Contract (HRN00), average of 2019-24 monthly prices. Source: [MarketWatch](#) (2019) [McKinsey](#), IEA [Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap](#) (2020), European Commission Joint Research Centre [Science for Policy Report](#) (2016).


Credit: Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer et al., "Decarbonizing Steel" (16 September 2024).



# Steel Decarbonization Technologies

# 1 Green H<sub>2</sub> DRI-EAF is an emerging technology using green hydrogen instead of natural gas as an iron ore reductant with standard electric arc furnaces

Green H<sub>2</sub> direct reduced iron-EAF has an average cited decarbonization potential of ~90%



Renewable electricity is used throughout the production process, including the creation of green hydrogen

Comes at a green price premium

## Observations

- **BF-BOF:** Iron ore, coke, and limestone produce iron in a blast furnace, which is turned into steel in an oxygen furnace
- **Scrap EAF:** Scrap metal is melted in an EAF using electrical energy
- **NG DRI-EAF:** Iron ore turns into iron using natural gas, which is then melted in an EAF to produce steel
- **Green H<sub>2</sub> DRI-EAF:** Green hydrogen replaces natural gas as an iron ore reductant; byproduct is water vs. CO<sub>2</sub>


Sources: [World Steel Association](#); [IEEFA](#) (2022); IEA, [Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap](#) (2020); Steel Technology, [Basic Oxygen Furnace Steelmaking](#); Recycling Today, [Growth of EAF Steelmaking](#); Wildsight, [Do We Really Need Coal to Make Steel](#).

Credit: Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer *et al.*, "[Decarbonizing Steel](#)" (16 September 2024).



## 2 Iron ore electrolysis is an emerging technology that uses an electric current to drive a chemical reaction, producing molten iron or pure solid iron

Iron ore electrolysis has an average cited decarbonization potential of ~97%



### Observations


- **BF-BOF:** Iron ore, coke, and limestone produce iron in a blast furnace, which is turned into steel in an oxygen furnace
- **Scrap EAF:** Scrap metal is melted in an electric arc furnace (EAF) using electrical energy
- **NG DRI-EAF:** Iron ore turns into iron using natural gas, which is then melted in an EAF to produce steel
- **Green H<sub>2</sub> DRI-EAF:** Green hydrogen replaces natural gas as an iron ore reductant; byproduct is water vs. CO<sub>2</sub>
- **Iron ore electrolysis:** Molten oxide electrolysis runs a current through iron ore and liquid electrolyte to split ore into pure molten iron; electrowinning-EAF dissolves iron from iron ore in acid, then electrifies it to form solid iron

Sources: [World Steel Association](#); [IEEFA](#) (2022); IEA, [Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap](#) (2020); Steel Technology, [Basic Oxygen Furnace Steelmaking](#); Recycling Today, [Growth of EAF Steelmaking](#); Wildsight, [Do We Really Need Coal to Make Steel](#).

Credit: Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer *et al.*, “[Decarbonizing Steel](#)” (16 September 2024).

### 3 Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) is an emerging technology that reduces steel's carbon footprint by capturing released CO<sub>2</sub>

Despite a cited ~90% decarbonization potential, CCUS technology is largely unproven



#### Observations

- **BF-BOF:** Iron ore, coke, and limestone produce iron in a blast furnace, which is turned into steel in an oxygen furnace
- **Scrap EAF:** Scrap metal is melted in an electric arc furnace using electrical energy
- **NG DRI-EAF:** Iron ore turns into iron using natural gas, which is then melted in an EAF to produce steel
- **Green H<sub>2</sub> DRI-EAF:** Green hydrogen replaces natural gas as an iron ore reductant; byproduct is water vs. CO<sub>2</sub>
- **Iron ore electrolysis:** Molten oxide electrolysis runs a current through iron ore and liquid electrolytes to split ore into pure molten iron; electrowinning-EAF dissolves iron from iron ore in acid, then electrifies it to form solid iron
- **CCUS:** Equipment is added to existing steel-producing infrastructure to capture emitted CO<sub>2</sub>, to then sequester or reuse

Sources: [World Steel Association](#); [IEEFA](#) (2022); IEA, [Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap](#) (2020); Steel Technology, [Basic Oxygen Furnace Steelmaking](#); Recycling Today, [Growth of EAF Steelmaking](#); Wildsight, [Do We Really Need Coal to Make Steel](#).

Credit: Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer *et al.*, "[Decarbonizing Steel](#)" (16 September 2024).

# Green H<sub>2</sub>, electrolysis, and CCUS could reduce steelmaking CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by over 85% if implemented at scale

	1	2	3
	100% Green Hydrogen (H <sub>2</sub> ) DRI-EAF	Iron Ore Electrolysis	Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS)
Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Green hydrogen</b> replaces <b>natural gas</b> as an iron ore reductant in DRI shaft; the rest of the process remains the same</li> <li>Generates <b>water as a byproduct</b> instead of CO<sub>2</sub></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Two different processes</b> are possible:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Molten oxide electrolysis:</b> High current runs through mixture of iron ore and liquid electrolyte to split ore into pure molten iron</li> <li><b>Electrowinning-EAF:</b> Iron from iron ore is dissolved in acid. Iron-rich solution is then electrified to form pure solid iron</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>CCUS equipment</b> can be added to <b>existing steel-producing infrastructure</b> to <b>capture</b> emitted CO<sub>2</sub></li> <li>Captured CO<sub>2</sub> is then <b>sequestered underground</b> or <b>reused</b></li> </ul>
Real-time sector initiatives	<a href="#">HYBRIT/Stegra</a> 100% fossil fuel-free DRI-EAF production with green H <sub>2</sub> used for DRI	<a href="#">Electra</a> Electrowinning to produce high-purity iron plates ready for EAF input (no DRI or MOE step)	<a href="#">ArcelorMittal</a> Carbalyst® captures carbon from a blast furnace and reuses it as bio-ethanol. However, technology not proven at scale
Applicability to conventional routes	<b>Applicable to existing DRI-EAF route</b> , with minor retrofitting	<b>Full overhaul</b> of BF-BOF equipment required; <b>replacement</b> of DRI shaft in DRI-EAF	<b>Retrofitting</b> of capture technology is possible on <b>conventional BF-BOF and DRI-EAF</b>
Decarbonization potential (vs. BF-BOF)	~90%	~97%	~90% <span>Hypothetical best-case scenario</span>
Estimated production cost (excl. CapEx)	<\$800 per tonne of steel	~\$215 per tonne of iron + cost of 'stranded' iron ore	~\$380 – 400 per tonne

Sources: [Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy](#) (2021); IEA, [Iron and Steel Technology Roadmap](#) (2020); [McKinsey](#) (2020); [Mining Technology](#) (2023); [Tata Steel](#); [Primetals Technologies](#); Edie, [ArcelorMittal accused of net-zero greenwashing](#) (2023).

Credit: Mimi Khawsam-ang, Max de Boer, Grace Frascati, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#). [Share with attribution](#): De Boer *et al.*, "[Decarbonizing Steel](#)" (16 September 2024).







# Investors:

- Altor Equity Partners
- AMF
- Andra AP-Fonden
- Ane & Robert Maersk Uggla
- BILSTEIN GROUP
- Cristina Stenbeck
- Daniel Ek
- EIT InnoEnergy
- Exor
- FAM
- GIC
- Hitachi Energy
- Hy24
- IMAS Foundation
- Just Climate
- Kingspan
- Kinnevik
- Kobe Steel
- Marcegaglia
- Mercedes-Benz AG
- Scania
- Schaeffler
- SMS Group
- Stena Metall Finans
- Swedbank Robur Alternative Equity
- Temasek
- Vargas

## Financing

Series A & B

**~€2.0 billion**


**Total Equity & Debt  
= €6.5 billion,  
as of January 2025**

Debt commitment

**€3.5 billion**

# ~40 Mt of green steel project announced in Europe by 2023, implying 2-2.4 Mt green H<sub>2</sub> demand

As of 2023, ~40 Mt of green steel projects announced in Europe alone




Source: Columbia Business School, [H2 Green Steel](#) (2024)



Credit: Friedrich Sayn-Wittgenstein, Ellie Valencia, Nadine Palmowski, Hyae Ryung Kim, and [Gernot Wagner](#) (12 December 2024); share/adapt [with attribution](#). Contact: [gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

# Northern Sweden has unique advantages from low-cost renewable electricity and iron ore deposits

Renewable share in electricity production in Europe  
2019



Industrial electricity prices in Europe  
2019




Source: International Energy Agency (IEA); Eurostat; ProMine




# 1 Green H<sub>2</sub> DRI-EAF process uses green electricity will halve carbon intensity but increases production costs by 23%

## Reduction in Carbon Footprint



## Increase in Production Costs







### Observations:

- Replacing the BF-BOF process with the **green hydrogen DRI-EAF process** with green electricity will cut steel production's carbon intensity by **59%**
- This transition **increases production costs by 23%**, driven by required investment costs for implementing the electric arc furnace (EAF)
- **Capital investment of \$210 million** is required, with the largest impact stemming from hydrogen adoption and grid decarbonization at the Iron Furnace stage

# The Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit could provide as much as a 60% subsidy for domestic solar production, if the full value chain is on-shored

Impact of IRA on domestic solar value chain

Polysilicon	Wafer	Cell	Module
			
<b>Production Credit:</b> \$3.00 / kg	<b>Production Credit:</b> \$12.00 / sq m	<b>Production Credit:</b> \$0.04 / W	<b>Production Credit:</b> \$0.07 / W
<b>Credit per Watt dc:</b> \$0.02 / W	<b>Credit per Watt dc:</b> \$0.07 / W		
<b>% of US-produced module price<sup>1)</sup>:</b> 6%	<b>% of US-produced module price:</b> 21%	<b>% of US-produced module price:</b> 12%	<b>% of US-produced module price:</b> 21%

1) Based on First Solar "average selling price" per module, as per company earnings calls and annual reports

# Climate Risks, Opportunities, and Geopolitics

28 May 2025



- ① Climate risk is financial risk
- ② Solar
- ③ Steel
- ④ Is the goal a high or a low price per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>?

**Gernot Wagner**

[gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)

[gwagner.com](http://gwagner.com)


# How to judge climate policies

Think “carbon price”, explicit or implicit


## High price

and/or(?!)

## Low cap



# Carbon price for EUA Futures, 2005–2016




Source: Bayer & Aklin *PNAS* (2020)

**B**

# ATT Estimates for EU ETS, 2008–2016

Generalized synthetic control




Source: Bayer & Aklin *PNAS* (2020)

EU Carbon Permits (EUR) 69.510 +4.930 (+7.63%)



Source: [tradingeconomics.com/commodity/carbon](https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/carbon)





Source: European Environment Agency

# How to judge climate policies

Think “carbon price” or cap, explicit or implicit

---

- Low cap = high carbon price

But also:

- High price → low CO<sub>2</sub> ‘demand’ → low price
- Race between price & cap on one hand, and clean-energy transition on the other

Does ‘success’ mean a high carbon price *or* a low cap?



**The New York Times**

Mott & Chace | Sotheby's International Realty

**SOUTH KINGSTOWN, RHODE ISLAND**



1119 Matunuck Beach Road  
2 BR | 3.1 BA | \$4,250,000  
sothebysrealty.com/id/5H8W7R  
**THE SOBY FOX TEAM** Sales Associates  
soby.fox@mottandchace.com 401.662.7969

**LITTLE COMPTON, RHODE ISLAND**







7 Beach Street  
4 BR | 3.1 BA | \$4,465,000  
sothebysrealty.com/id/GF545Z  
**CHERRY ARNOLD** Sales Associate  
cherry.arnold@mottandchace.com 401.864.5401

**NORTH KINGSTOWN, RHODE ISLAND**



**BRISTOL, RHODE ISLAND**

**Gernot Wagner**  
[gwagner@columbia.edu](mailto:gwagner@columbia.edu)  
[gwagner.com](http://gwagner.com)